Beijing, Feb. 13, 2026 — This year’s annual military-political meeting in Beijing has attracted attention not for its statements, but for who was missing.
Footage released by Chinese state media from the Feb. 5 “Capital Military-Political Symposium” showed only seven lieutenant generals and 13 major generals in attendance, with no full generals present—a stark departure from previous years.
Analysts of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) elite politics say the absence is unusual and potentially revealing. Historically, at least one full general has attended the high-profile gathering, but the 2026 lineup suggests ongoing purges may have hollowed out the upper ranks of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), creating what some observers describe as a power vacuum at the top.
The contrast with prior years is notable. In 2024, PLA Navy Admiral Miao Hua, then director of the Central Military Commission’s (CMC) Political Work Department, attended alongside seven lieutenant generals. In 2025, PLA Army General He Hongjun, deputy head of the same department, appeared with four lieutenant generals. Both have since been purged—Miao in July 2024 and He in October 2025.
Other senior officers who attended past symposiums have also disappeared from public view or been investigated. Of the seven lieutenant generals present in 2024, at least one—Zhang Fengzhong, then political commissar of the PLA Rocket Force—has been purged. Among four lieutenant generals from 2025, two were absent this year, with their current positions unclear.
Only PLA Air Force Deputy Political Commissar Ji Duo has consistently attended the symposium over the past three years, while most others have rotated out under clouds of investigation.
Since the CCP’s 20th National Congress in 2022, at least 15 active-duty full generals have been publicly investigated, and roughly 20 others have vanished from public life. Only four full generals, including CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Shengmin and Defense Minister Dong Jun, are believed to be functioning normally.
The PLA Rocket Force, responsible for China’s missile arsenal, has been particularly affected. Since mid-2023, three consecutive commanders have been investigated, and two former defense ministers, Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, were purged for alleged corruption. Among the seven lieutenant generals attending the Feb. 5 symposium was Ding Xingnong, deputy political commissar of the Rocket Force, whose career trajectory has drawn scrutiny.
The day after the symposium, Chinese leader Xi Jinping attended a Lunar New Year performance for retired military cadres, accompanied by a noticeably smaller group of senior officers.
Only Zhang Shengmin, a current CMC member, was visibly at Xi’s side. The event also adopted a new auditorium-style seating, replacing the traditional roundtable arrangement often used to signal hierarchy and favor.
Observers say the changes may reflect efforts to obscure internal personnel dynamics. “In the CCP’s propaganda system, what is lacking is often what is most loudly emphasized,” said Shen Ming-Shih, research fellow at Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research. Analysts also suggest that public appearances are a proxy for power, with absences signaling possible factional tension or resistance within the military.
The ongoing reshuffling underscores structural and political challenges at the top of the PLA. The CMC currently has five vacant general-level seats out of seven, and dozens of other key posts remain unfilled or held in an acting capacity. Factional dynamics, particularly in the Eastern and Central Theater Commands responsible for Taiwan contingencies and Beijing’s defense, will be critical to watch.
In China’s political system, ultimate authority rests on control of the military. Analysts note that limited visible support from theater commanders and service chiefs could indicate that Xi’s grip on the PLA remains contested, with implications for both internal stability and the broader command of the armed forces.
